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Introduction

The United States of America is a nation founded on a tax revolt. The Founding
Fathers recognized that citizens would never enjoy their freedom if they were taxed without
representation. Once they secured independence, they framed our Constitution with ten initial
amendments, the Bill of Rights, which were a series of the limitations on the power of the
United States government. The goal of the Bill of Rights was to protect the natural rights of
liberty and property of the citizens of the United States. Prior to the passage of Proposition
13 in California, the citizens of American knew that even with representation, our individual
liberty could still be threatened by the government. In California, the conservative, anti-big
government tide in American began with the passage of Proposition 13.
The California experience previous to the passage of Proposition 13 taught the
citizens of California that even with representation, the freedoms of individuals could be
threatened. This lesson is especially true when we see the assessment scandals, a rapidly
increasing real estate market and the failure of California’s representative officials to respond
to the threat to individual liberty. In addition to watching corrupt tax assessors take
advantage of the system, individuals were tired of paying inflated property taxes that were
changing drastically from year to year. People’s homes were literally being taken from them
by the power of the tax collector. This strongly deviated from the initial founding of our
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nation that was supposed to be “of the people, by the people and for the people.” While few
people initially expected Proposition 13 to pass, ultimately it passed with 64.8 percent of the
vote.

The initiative process in California gave individuals the opportunity to make a

constitutional amendment to the California Constitution in regards to the taxation processes
of the government. With the passage of Proposition 13, the citizens of California made their
statement.
Proposition 13, passed on June 6, 1978. The measure lowered property taxes by
rolling back property values to their 1975 levels, states that the maximum amount of any tax
based on real estate shall not exceed one percent of the full cash value of the property, and
restricts annual increases in assessed values of real property to an inflation factor cap set at
two percent per year. It also prohibited reassessment of a new base year value except upon
change in ownership, completion of new construction or a newly built property. In addition
to lowering property taxes, the initiative contained language requiring a two-thirds majority
in both legislative houses for future increases in all state tax rates or amounts of revenue
collected, including income tax rates. It also required a two-thirds majority vote in local
elections for local governments that wished to raise special taxes.
Since its inception Proposition 13 has had powerful enemies. Politicians have
opposed it because they see it as limiting their power. Public employee unions have resisted
it because they see any restriction on government’s ability to tax as a threat to their jobs and
wages. There have been misunderstood consequences of Proposition 13 that are often
wrongly attributed to having come about as a result of the initiative. Redevelopment, new
city incorporations and annexations and the fiscalization of land use are all attributed to
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Proposition 13. While Proposition 13 has had an influence on how California communities
are shaped and planned, there are a wide number of reasons why these things have happened,
and probably would have happened in the absence of Proposition 13. The fight for money has
also been and always will be an issue in regards to the government.
The services that the government are expected to provide are feasible only if there
are enough revenues. This constant battle between costs and revenues and the desire for
services is a politically charged one that is common in today’s world. The truth is that
Proposition 13 did not have a negative effect on overall revenues at both the state and local
levels. By analyzing the statistics from state revenue streams as well as local revenue streams
it is evident that not only have overall revenues increased in the state of California, but for
local governments, property tax revenues have increased proportional to inflation.
Additionally, the acquisition-value system that was set up as a result of Proposition 13 has
worked to provide a solid level of predictability for both individual property owners and
budget directors. Currently, the most popular movement to reform Proposition 13 is to
develop a split-roll tax system. This type of system would take the place of the current
acquisition system and it would divide the tax treatment of commercial and residential
properties by removing the protections form commercial properties. The negative
consequences of the split-roll tax far outweigh the positives. The split-roll would adversely
impact small businesses which would create a less-competitive climate for California’s
businesses to expand and created jobs; further hurting the already fragile economy.
The final chapter of this thesis is a Case Study of the County of Orange in Southern
California. The study of Orange County provides a strong demonstration for the contentious
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struggle between blaming Proposition 13 and recognizing that aggressive spending is to
blame. This analysis also addresses the invalid statement that revenues are not able to
increase as fast as inflation because of the two percent cap that Proposition 13 placed on
reassessments.
Proposition 13 is one of the most popular, voter-approved tax measures that has
passed in California. As some proponents of Proposition 13 argue, the fiscal problem is in the
failure of the state to get its budgetary house in order. It is not at the local level. Those who
live off of government dollars do not like to see restrictions. This is how most of the enemies
of Proposition 13 come about, they do not have enough money and need a scapegoat, and
Proposition 13 is the answer. Property tax is a county or city revenue source. The state
backfills counties with a surplus of revenue and when this surplus was reduced by
Proposition 13, counties and local governments had to find a different way to raise taxes.1
This was something new that they had never had to do before. Local governments felt
entitled to the monies that were no longer available. Today, counties and cities have to live
within more restricted means then they had to previous to Proposition 13 when they had
unlimited dollars to spend.
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Chapter 1: The Beginning of the Tax Revolt

For California’s local governments the world changed dramatically in 1978, with the
passage of Proposition 13. Prior to that time, the property tax was considered a “local” tax,
and counties, cities, special districts, and school districts had the authority to levy taxes in
order to generate revenues. Taxpayers reacted to the dramatic increase in property taxes and
the growing state revenue surplus of nearly $5 billion by voting to amend California’s
Constitution through Proposition 13. 2 Due to assessment scandals, a rapidly increasing real
estate market and the failure of the legislature to act, the historic Proposition 13 was the
catalyst of the tax revolt in California and across the United States.

Assessment Scandals

In 1965, when it was revealed that elected tax assessors were receiving campaign
contributions from interested parties as they reviewed and adjusted assessments on business
properties, the idea for Proposition 13 was planted.3

Due to the corruption, local

governments dramatically increased property tax throughout the state in the mid 1960’s. The
assessors of San Francisco and Alameda County were convicted of bribery and sent to
prison, and the San Diego County Assessor committed suicide after these bribery schemes
were uncovered.4 Spurred by the outcry over these scandals, the California State Legislature
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passed AB 80 in 1967.5 This law required communities to reassess all property at 25 percent
of their values, within three years, and then to conduct frequent reassessments in order to
keep the ratio intact.
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AB 80 helped curb corruption by requiring local officials to assess

homes at a uniform fraction of their current market value.

However, the unintended

consequence of this reform was that assessments for homeowners increased rapidly, since as
real estate values escalated, so did home assessment fees. Previously, commercial properties
had been assessed at a higher ratio of market value compared to single-family housing. Since
the uniform rate of twenty-five percent brought down the total amount of revenues that local
governments and the state collected from property taxes, homeowners had to assume a
greater share of the tax burden if the overall level of revenue was to be maintained. As
residential property tends to change hands more quickly as long as real estate prices moved
upwards, shortening the reassessment cycle, and making the estimates more frequent, overall
tax burden of individual homeowners was increased. Due to these changes made by AB 80,
the property tax was collected twice a year in large, in increasing sums of money and began
to create panic among homeowners. For the tax collector, the ideal tax is neither seen nor
felt, it is simply absorbed without causing an additional burden on the consumer. At this
time the property tax had the exact opposite characteristics.
In the aftermath of A.B 80, Phillip Watson, the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor,
sponsored Proposition 9 in 1968. This measure proposed property taxes cuts and increased
sales and sin taxes. Sin taxes are state-sponsored taxes that are added to products or services
that are seen as vices, such as alcohol and cigarettes. The 1968 initiative required that
property-tax revenues be used for “property-related” services only and that the state
governments relieve the burden on homeowners by assuming the responsibility for such
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“people-related” services such as health and education.7 More importantly, it provided that
property taxes could not exceed 1 percent of a property’s current value.8 Leaders of the state
Democratic and Republican parties, including Republican Governor Ronald Reagan, opposed
the initiative. Reagan and the state legislature approved their own measure, Proposition 1-A,
and placed it on the ballot in attempt to try to stave off Proposition 9. This measure offered
more modest property tax relief by exempting the first $750 of a home’s assessed value from
taxes. On Election Day, Watson’s Proposition 9 was rejected by a margin of 68 percent to 32
percent, and the legislature’s Proposition 1A was approved.9
In 1972, in a second attempt to try and combat increasing property taxes and reform
the system, Watson qualified a second measure, Proposition 14. This initiative specified
increases for the state sales tax, liquor tax, cigarette tax, and corporate income tax. The
measure also proposed a uniform limit on per-pupil expenditures for local schools. State
leaders from both parties, as well as a coalition of tobacco and alcohol industries, and public
school employees attacked Proposition 14. Just as they had opposed Proposition 9, the
state’s political and business leaders, including Governor Reagan, opposed this initiative. The
political establishment was against the measure because they argued that slashing property
taxes would necessitate increases in the income and sales tax in order offset the difference
and remain able to pay for government programs.10

The business community was scared

that Proposition 13 would work like an “atomic bomb” as all sales, income and corporate
taxes would have to be increased substantially to make up for the difference in lost property
tax revenues.11 Again, the State Legislature responded by approving an alternative tax relief
program, S.B 90, that increased the exemption on homes to $1,750 in assessed value,
increased sales taxes, and placed some limits on city and county tax rates.
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On Election
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Day voters again overwhelmingly rejected Watson’s initiative as they still had optimism
about the state’s economy and did not want to risk cuts in public spending.
Even though Watson’s two attempts to reform the property tax system had failed, the
legislature sensed a growing constituency for government downsizing. Seeing the increased
popular support for reducing in property taxes, Governor Reagan and the State Legislature
responded to the threat to government revenues posed by Watson’s initiatives by reaching
bipartisan agreement on more limited forms of tax relief that were acceptable to the
electorate. In 1973, Governor Reagan proposed Proposition 1, an amendment to the state’s
constitution to limit the size of the public sector. This measure would have limited the annual
growth of total state expenditures to the increases in state income, tightened the limits on
local tax rates imposed by S.B 90, restricted the growth of state government to the growth
rate of personal income, and required a two-thirds legislative majority for state tax bills.13
Written with the help of economist Milton Friedman, Proposition 1 would have embedded
the spending limit in the state constitution. Governor Reagan argued that this was the only
sure way to reverse the steady increase in the size of the state government. His opponents,
who included the state’s Democratic leaders and the public employee’s unions, rebutted that
such a limit would either force renewed reliance on the property tax to fund services or
would result in unacceptable cuts in public programs. The opposition’s argument resonated
and by a vote of 54 percent to 46 percent this measure failed. 14

Rampant Inflation in the Real Estate Market
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The basis of Proposition 13 was simple. People were angry. Howard Jarvis’ famous
line in the campaign for Proposition 13 was, “we’re mad as hell and we’re not going to take
it anymore.”15

In addition to watching corrupt tax assessors take advantage of the system,

individuals were tired of paying inflated property taxes that would drastically increase from
year to year. The backbone of Proposition 13 was as straightforward as helping people keep
their home that they had worked so hard to purchase. The heavy burden being placed on
property owners was the most significant tax problem for the individual from 1956 to 1978.
In 1974, the boom in California’s real estate market began. The resulting inflation carried the
anti-tax spirit throughout California. This economic boom caused property taxes to soar as
the procedures governing assessment ensured that rising values were registered in tax bills.
During this time, real property was appraised cyclically, with no more than a five-year
interval between reassessments. Since property values were systematically reviewed and
updated, assessed values were usually kept at, or near, current market value levels. Some
properties were reassessed upwards by 50 percent or 100 percent in just one year and their
owner’s tax bills, as a percentage of that increased value, jumped correspondingly. It was not
uncommon that an individual in the 1950’s who had bought their house for $14,000 was
being taxed on a value of a house worth $100,000. 16 As a result of an efficient assessment
system, rampant inflation in California’s home prices, drove up residential property tax bills
at astronomical rates. While this did create a positive impact for individuals who sold their
homes, it created a major problem for those who were trying to keep their properties. Owning
a home does not increase one’s income, yet an increase in property tax value or property tax
reassessment can easily outstrip any increase in a person’s personal income or ability to pay,
especially if the homeowner lives on a fixed income. In some cases, home prices would
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double, and then double again, in a period of four to five years, rising to the point where
thousands of people genuinely feared that they would lose their homes. Between 1974 and
1978, the market value of an average home in California went from $34,000 to $85,000.
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By 1977-78 property taxes in California were approximately 52 percent above the national
rates.18 Just before the vote on Proposition 13, the overall per capita burden of state and local
taxes in California was exceeded only in Alaska and New York.19
Table 1: Comparison of Property Tax Bills under Pre-Proposition 13 and Post-Proposition 13
Assessments 20
2006-2007
2006-07 Using
using Pre-Prop Post-Prop 13
13 Method
Method
California Median
$556,430
Home Value

$556,430

Assessment Ratio

92%

51.30%

Assessed Value

$511,915

$285,448

Average Tax Rate 2.70%
Annual Property
$13,668
Tax Bill
Monthly Property
$1,139
Tax Bill

1.10%
$3,129
$261

Table 1 illustrates this difference. If the median value California home of $556,430,
in 2006 was taxed using 1977’s average tax rate and assessment ratio, the tax would be
$13,668, rather than just over $3000. Compounding this problem was the cyclical
reassessment plan used by most assessors that could cause property taxes to more than
double in one year.

This created a major problem for homeowners since so much of

California, and America, was settled on the foundation of moving west and homeownership.
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One of the major core foundations of our country was being threatened by a seemingly
uncontrollable property tax.
The tax revolt in California erupted in the context of high and rising levels of state
taxation in many ways. While inflation affected property taxes, it also contributed to the rise
in the amount of sales and income taxes paid. While inflation and nominal incomes were
increasing, a stagnant national economy stalled corresponding growth in real incomes. The
result was bracket creep, a situation where inflation pushes income into higher tax brackets
resulting in an increase in income but no increase in real purchasing power. Even though
individuals did not have any increase in the number of goods and services they could
purchase, they were paying more in federal and state sales and income tax for each bundle.
On top of this, property taxes were out of control. Many singled out property taxes as
particularly unfair because of how unpredictable they were. The need to deal with the
problems of the rapidly climbing property tax bills was apparent by 1977. This time the state
government had failed to meet the demands of the people which opened the door for Howard
Jarvis to start his revolution.

Failure to Change spurs the Campaign for Change

Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann became the faces of Proposition 13. While Jarvis was
working to qualify a property tax-cutting initiative in southern California, retired real estate
agent Gann was making a similar attempt in Northern California. After Phillip Watson’s
attempts to reform the property tax failed, he decided to work with Jarvis, and he brought
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Gann into the mix.21 Since all three had worked separately on property tax reform measures it
made sense that they combine their efforts on a new measure. However, Watson’s office was
being investigated for serious wrongdoing and Jarvis did not want the investigation to cloud
the initiative effort. Watson stepped back and Jarvis and Gann became the proponents of
Proposition 13.

They began circulating petitions for their initiative only after the

legislature’s efforts to pass a tax-relief bill during its 1977 session failed. 22 Elected officials
in Sacramento could not reach an agreement over the amount of tax relief how to target the
assistance. Additionally, with statewide elections approaching, how to apportion political
credit for a tax cut became a bitterly contested issue. Republican legislators suspected
Governor Brown of having allowed the surplus to accumulate in order to be able to provide a
tax rebate at the time of his campaign for reelection, thereby making himself look good
politically. 23 Republican’s interest in thwarting the governor’s political ambition made them
reluctant to accept compromise proposals for tax relief that Brown was willing to sign. On
the Democratic side, the governor’s separation and aloofness from the legislature reduced his
ability to force consensus between both parties. There were many political factors and
general distrust in the government that led to the passage of Proposition 13.
Howard Jarvis had a simple rule of economics when it came to the government, “You
can’t take more water from a bucket than you can put it.”

24

Initially, nearly the entire

political establishment opposed Proposition 13; from then Democratic Governor Jerry
Brown, the state’s Democratic leaders, many of the prominent Republicans in the state, to
public employee unions, chambers of commerce and many of the major businesses in the
state. Businesses were against Proposition 13 because they believed that if property taxes
were cut, the legislature would raise corporate and business taxes to compensate for the
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revenue loss.25 Proposition 13 was a significant change and many people were wary to vote
on something so dramatic. Additionally, many thought Howard Jarvis was a nutcase and did
not take him seriously.26 The opposition centered on the “devastating” consequences of the
massive tax relief Proposition 13 would have. They argued that local services would be cut,
and that the state surplus was not enough to cover the lost revenues so other taxes would
have to be raised. With the campaign for Proposition 13 underway, the legislature finally
reached an agreement and decided to act. Proposition 8, also known as the Behr bill,
emerged. This bill reduced property taxes by about one-third, taxed homeowners at a lower
rate than commercial property owners, and limited future state and local expenditures to
general economic growth factors.27 While Proposition 8, unlike 13, did present renters with a
rebate, it did not reduce government spending and instead substituted state revenues for lost
local tax dollars.28 Howard Jarvis attacked this as a “cruel hoax” that represented another
attempt by the politicians of California to deny citizens a tax cut.29
While initially the prospects of Proposition 13 passing looked dim, things began to
change in the final month leading up to the election. In the first week of May, a month
before the election, Proposition 13 held only a slim margin in the polls of 42 percent to 39
percent, with 19 percent undecided.30 Then news came that pushed Proposition 13 to victory.
The first was the revelation that the state of California was sitting on a huge surplus of
taxpayer dollars that could be used to offset the tax cuts. The second was from Los Angeles
County Assessor, Alexander Pope. Pope had only been in office for only ten weeks at the
time and was under growing pressure to make new assessments for the year available to
those taxpayers who wanted to come downtown and look at them. While County Supervisors
tried to keep the results secret until after the election, Pope gave in three weeks before the
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election.

31

The results were far worse than most people had imagined they would be. Most

of the new assessments at this time were from the wealthier West Side of Los Angeles and
the increases were immense. In addition, the state’s huge surplus confirmed another fact for
the voters –the government was taking in too much tax revenue. State revenue had increased
over the last few years, but the revenue was coming in at a faster rate than the government
could spend. At this point, the cautious approach people were taking to Proposition 13 ended.
In a panic, Governor Brown and the Los Angeles County supervisors agreed to order
Assessor Pope to roll back the assessments, but at that point the City of Los Angeles declared
it had been counting on those assessments. If they were rolled back, the city would have to
raise its rates. This meant that there would be tax increases for hundreds of thousands of Los
Angeles City property owners who had not had their properties up for reassessment that
year.32

The anger in Los Angeles reverberated around the state and public attention was

concentrated on the reality of rising taxes, crowding out the warnings about the disruption of
services that would result should Proposition 13 pass. Despite the huge state surplus the State
Legislature, for two consecutive sessions, was unable to enact a property tax or income tax
relief measure from among the 20-odd bill proposed.33 The citizens of California were finally
seeing the truth in what Howard Jarvis had been preaching; property taxes were certain to
increase, and people would struggle to keep their homes.
On June 6, 1978, voter turnout was high and the citizens of California passed
Proposition 13 with nearly 65 percent of the vote.34 Proposition 13 lost in only three of
California’s 58 counties.35 The people had finally spoken and Proposition 13 became a
reality.
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Chapter 2: Immediate Impact and Steps taken after the Passage of Proposition 13

More than just providing a stable source of government revenue, the property tax has
appealed to voters because it gives a highly visible tax price tag for public services and
directly links the costs of services to tangible economic developments in a community. In the
1960’s, the visibility of this tax made it a target for voter frustration about government
spending. Once Proposition 13 passed, the entire process for assessing and allocating
property taxes among local governments in California was revised. Prior to Proposition 13,
locally assessed real property was valued each year using a current market standard. After the
initiative passed, the legislature was given the power to create an acquisition value system
that created a more predictable stream of property tax revenue. This process changed the
entire landscape of government in California.
Proposition 13 amended the California Constitution to subject locally assessed real
property to a new set of valuation rules, commonly referred to as the “acquisition value”
standard. This change immediately reduced property taxes on homes, businesses, farms and
other property across the state by about 57 percent, or a total of about $7 billion.36 Under the
acquisition value system, property taxes were rolled back to the 1975-76 fiscal year fair
market value levels. Property tax base values cannot exceed one percent of the property’s
market value, and, absent a sale or major remodeling, a property’s base year value is adjusted
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upwards each assessment year to reflect inflation as shown by the California Consumer Price
Index. However, these adjustments are capped at a maximum of two percent annually. When
a property is sold, newly constructed, or subjected to any other change of ownership, the
property is reassessed at the current fair market value. This market value becomes the
property’s new base value and then begins to be reassessed each year with the maximum
increase capped at two percent. Additionally, Proposition 13 requires that all state tax rate
increases be approved by a two-thirds vote of the legislature and that local special tax
increases be improved by a two-thirds vote of the people.
Prior to Proposition 13, the tax rate throughout California averaged a little less than 3
percent of market value and there were minor limits on increases for the tax rate and no
limits on increases in property value assessments. 37 Some properties were reassessed upward
of 50 percent to 100 percent in a single year, and the owner’s tax bills, as a fixed percentage
of that increased value, increased accordingly. Proposition 13 made property taxes more
predictable, as new buyers would know both what the current tax rate would be and the
maximum amount the property tax could increase each year they owned the property. Under
Proposition 13, property tax revenue has become far more stable than other forms of tax
revenue such as income tax and sales tax.
Because of Proposition 13, the composition of California’s revenue stream has
changed. Property taxes now are a much smaller share of the total pie, and because of this the
state now relies heavily on much more volatile sources of income such as sales and income
taxes. Property taxes collected by the state have to be allocated among several thousand
local governments, pursuant to a complex state statute that was put into place after

20

Proposition 13 was passed, as property taxes are linked to local revenue sources. In the wake
of Proposition 13, the state legislature had three weeks to adopt measures to reorganize local
finance, find a way to allocate property taxes to each of these portions fairly, and help
smooth over the transition period.
Creating the Allocation System

By setting a statewide property tax rate of one percent, Proposition 13 removed the
debate over local property tax rates from city council chambers and county board rooms and
replaced it with a discussion at the state level about how to allocate portions of the fixed
budget pie. Instead of a debate that directly affected many members of the community
through their property tax bills, the debate turned into a competition for resources among
specific programs. In designing the allocation formula, the legislature looked at various
models when trying to decide how to best apportion property tax funds fairly.
The current system is governed to a large extent by two bills developed by the
legislature soon after Proposition 13 was passed – SB 154 and AB 8. One plan that they
proposed would have divided the property tax equally among various levels of government,
however, this idea was rejected by a Proposition 13 conference after protests from
jurisdictions that would have lost a substantial amount of property taxes.38

The only

politically feasible option the legislature could come up with, and the one adopted by SB
154, was to give all local jurisdictions the same proportionate share of the property tax that
existed before Proposition 13 was passed. SB 154 was termed the “bail-out bill” and
allocated property tax revenues from the one percent to local agencies as well as provided
some backfill to local agencies for the revenue loss that resulted because of Proposition 13. 39
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Additionally SB 154 established a formula for the distribution of the remaining amount of
property taxes. This formula allocated revenues from the one percent rate established by
Proposition 13, to all counties, cities, special districts, and schools on a proportionate basis.
Average property tax revenues for the prior three fiscal years were calculated for each agency
and each level then received its percentage share of the counties new, smaller, property tax
revenue pot. However, this formula has since come into criticism for giving some counties a
much larger share of the property tax than others as it did not account of population growth
or other changes that have occurred over the last thirty years. While the property tax rate and
assessment practices are uniform statewide, there is considerable variation in the distribution
of property taxes among local governments. Since these percentage rates were determined in
1978 based on the amount of services each level of government was providing, many places
argue that those numbers are not brought up to current day standards. Recognizing individual
counties responsibilities to provide health and welfare programs jointly funded by the state,
SB 154 also relieved a portion of counties’ financial obligation for certain programs.40
Additionally, $878 million in state General Fund revenues was provided to local
governments as block grants. These payments were structured to protect local agencies from
falling below 90 percent of their pre-Proposition 13 property tax revenue receipts.41
In 1979, the Legislature passed AB 8, which created a more long-term response to
Proposition 13 by making two significant changes in the allocation formula that was outlined
by SB 154. Although it has been amended several times and now contains a multitude of
topics, AB 8 is the basic operating legislation today. Most importantly, AB 8 created a new
plan for allocating property tax revenues among local agencies that would restore fiscal
stability, as well as eliminate the need for annual budget battles over local government
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bailouts. It shifted property tax revenue from school districts to counties, cities, and special
districts, and then replaced the schools’ losses with state General Fund revenues. The AB 8
shift basically increased each local agency’s share of the property tax by the amount of its SB
154 block grant, as follows:42
•

Cities received 82.9 percent of their 1978-79 block grants.

•

Special districts received 95.2 percent of their block grants.

•

Counties received the sum of the 1978-79 block grant, plus an amount specified in
AB 8, representing the reduction in the state’s buy-out Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) costs, minus a new state grant for county health
services.
Importantly, AB 8 also allocated the growth in property tax revenues based on the

location of the subject property. Thus, property tax revenues that resulted from increases in
assessed valuation accrue only to the jurisdictions in which the increases took place.
Provisions were also included to allocate revenue when there was a jurisdictional change
such as an annexation, the creation of a new city, or transfer of services.
Since SB 154 and AB 8 there have been three major changes to the property tax
system. The first was the Legislature’s approach to no and low property tax cities. These are
cities that, prior to the passage of Proposition 13, did not levy a property tax, levied only a
very low property tax, or were not incorporated. Using the AB 8 formula, these cities were
not allocated a significant share of the property tax. Beginning in 1984, the Legislature
shifted property tax revenues from counties and gave them to cities that were characterized as
“no or low.”43
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The second significant change was the property tax shifts of 1992-93 and 1993-94.
The state was experiencing severe budget deficits during the recession of the early 1990’s
and implemented a $3.6 billion shift of property tax revenue from counties, cities, and special
districts to schools, thereby reducing the state’s General Fund obligation to schools by an
equivalent amount. To compensate for these losses, the state government ordered county
auditors to transfer about twenty-five percent of property taxes that had been previously
allocated to cities and counties, to schools.44 This reduced the state general fund commitment
to K-14 education. These property tax revenues that were shifted were known as the
Educational Revenue Augmentation Funds, or ERAF shift. This tax shift continues today
with a total transfer of approximately $5 billion annually. With ERAF, the state government
shifted its fiduciary responsibility from local governments to schools.
The third significant change was the Legislature’s use of ERAF as a mechanism for
fiscal reform and relief. In 2004-05, two changes to the allocation of property taxes were
implemented. The first, termed the “triple flip”, provided the state with a mechanism to fund
$15 billion in economic recovery bonds without raising taxes.45 The triple flip was passed by
the Legislature and approved by the voters as Proposition 57 in March 2004. It involves
increasing the state share of the sales and use tax rate by 0.25 percent and reducing the local
sales and use tax rate by a corresponding 0.25 percent.
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The revenue lost by cities and

counties as a result of the local sales and use tax reduction were backfilled by property tax
revenues from ERAF. The state’s share of the increased sales and use tax revenues is
dedicated to repayment of the economic recovery bonds. Once the bonds are repaid, the state
sales and use tax rate will be reduced by 0.25 percent and the local rate will increase by 0.25
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percent, bringing all entities back to the sales tax rates effective in 2003-04, and the backfill
will end.47
In some counties, these changes will have a substantial impact on the amount of
property tax revenues that they receive. While the triple flip will not necessarily mean an
increase in overall revenues, counties will most likely become more reliant on property tax as
a revenue source. In order to lessen this dependence, local governments are able to enact
additional fees and taxes on the consumer in order to offset the loss of property tax revenues
they have experienced from Proposition 13. Counties have the ability, with voter’s
permission, to increase local sales tax in order to fund local services. Vehicle license fees
have also become an area that has helped local governments to retain some of the lost
property tax funds. Local governments have had to be creative with coming up with way to
try and make up the lost property tax revenue. However, as will be shown in Chapter 4, even
though property tax revenues are probably lower today than they would have been without
Proposition 13, they are still increasing at a rate higher than inflation.
One issue that has brought about exasperation from individual taxpayers is the fixed
charges and special assessment fees that appear on each Property Tax Statement. These fees
predate Proposition 13.48 They are measures either voted on by the constituents of an area, or
passed in statue that allow counties, cities, school districts, water districts, or other such
entities to enact an additional charge or fee on the taxpayer for a specific purpose.
Proposition 13 states that the maximum amount of any tax shall not exceed one percent of the
full cash value of the property. This one percent was set, but still allowed for additional fees
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to be imposed in order to provide a mechanism for jurisdictions to collect additional
revenue.49

Constitutionality of Proposition 13

As early as April 1978, opponents of Proposition 13 began to come up with a strategy
to attack Proposition 13’s constitutionality based on this apportionment system. Proposition
13 and AB 8 generated two important outcomes. First, the property tax is no longer a local
tax, which is something Howard Jarvis did not expect to happen. Proposition 13 set the rate
and the base value; and AB 8 – enacted by the state – allocates who receives what portion of
the money. Second, because of this formula there is large amount of variation in the
allocation of the tax. Many arguments about the fairness of this policy arose since these
levels were locked in at 1978 values. This discrepancy in the allocation process is a major
reason why the argument that Proposition 13’s acquisition tax plan is unfair, is so prevalent.
The Amador Valley Joint Union High School District, feeling unfairly treated by
Proposition 13, became the lead school district to challenge Proposition 13 in the Amador
case.50 The lawsuit challenged Proposition 13 on five main issues - breaching the singlesubject rule, violating the prohibition against an initiative revising the Constitution instead of
amending it, impairment of state contract since the tax cut would require local government to
forgo its contractual obligations that it could no longer afford, and most importantly,
claiming that equal protection under the state law was violated. Under the new tax system,
side-by-side homes which were identical would pay different tax amounts based on when the
homes were purchased.

The California Supreme Court, by declaring that the measure
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operated functionally within a relatively narrow range to accomplish a new system of
taxation, made a definitive 6 to 1 ruling that Proposition 13 did not violate the state
constitution.
Critics argue that market-value inequity is one of the major flaws of Proposition 13.
They point to these discrepancies in property tax values for side by side properties. The
Amador case was not the final ruling for these issues, in fact, a case challenging the validity
of Proposition 13 on federally constituted grounds made it all the way to the U.S Supreme
Court.

In 1991, Stephanie Nordlinger appealed to the Supreme Court under the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States Constitution.51
Nordlinger purchased a home in the Baldwin Hill’s section of Los Angeles in 1988, and soon
realized she was paying five times more in property taxes then her neighbors who had lived
in similar homes since 1975.
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On June 18, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled by an 8-1

margin that Proposition 13 was constitutional.

The Supreme Court put all doubts on

Proposition 13’s constitutionality to rest when they held that “California’s new property tax
system rationally and plausibly furthered legitimate state interests in restraining increasing
property taxes and preserving neighborhood stability.” 53
When looking at the equal protection under the law argument one must compare the
changes Proposition 13 made to previous property assessments. If one person bought a home
at an inflated price, through no action of their own, all of the neighbors would see their
homes reassessed to reflect the inflated price of the home they did not buy, and they would
all be taxed according to the new tax rate set by the county. While under Proposition 13
neighbors may be paying largely different property taxes, each individual’s value is based on
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the market value of when they purchased their house. Therefore, each individual has a
property tax that reflects the year they bought their home and the price they paid for it, not
the value of the homes surrounding them. This creates a more fair and equal tax base. All
taxpayers are treated equally when they set their property taxes as the sales price under
Proposition 13. The perceived inequality comes later when a new buyer enters into the
neighborhood and that buyer’s taxes are adjusted according to the current assessed value of
the property. Additionally, disparities in property tax systems are not something that occurred
only because of Proposition 13. Data for an assessment roll in 1965, pre-Proposition 13,
demonstrates that there were serious departures from the goal of uniform assessments. In San
Francisco, where the countywide assessment ratio was 18.6 percent, one industrial property
of a sample of 42 different properties was assessed at 4.6 percent of full value while another
was valued at 114 percent.54 San Francisco was not an isolated incident, these discrepancies
were occurring across the state. This shows that they property tax disparities pre-Proposition
13 were at least, as blatant, if not more so than Nordlinger argued in her case to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
While unease about individual tax rates have been addressed, a common concern
people have is regarding the wide discrepancies that occur across counties. Three factors of
why these variances have occurred are, the number and value of homes and businesses in the
area, the extent to which a local government provides municipal services, and the state laws
that govern the share of property taxes retained by a local community.
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Number and Value of Homes and Businesses in the Area

Throughout California a very diverse range of communities exist. Some regions are
extensively developed and have many high value homes and businesses, while others have
few land developments and residential areas. Generally, high property values yield high
property tax revenues. Because property taxes are levied in proportion to the assessed value
of property, communities with more land developments and higher-value land developments
receive more property taxes than communities with fewer developments. This is because
there are fewer services to provide for vacant or undeveloped land, which has led to the
widespread expansion of redevelopment agencies.

Local Government providing Municipal Services and State Laws

All local governments are not created equally. Besides the obvious differences in size
and population, counties, cities, and school districts vary according to the demands of their
constituents and the nature of the local economy, as well as the needs and services of the
jurisdiction. Some cities and counties supply a full array of government services while other
cities and counties rely upon special districts to provide some or all of these services such as:
fire protection, police protection, park and recreation programs and trash and water
maintenance. Less than twenty-five percent of California cities are full-service cities,
responsible for funding all of the major city general fund-supported services: such as public
protection, infrastructure and capital improvements.
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Statewide 557 special districts issue

fire protection services and 293 special districts provide park and recreation services.56

In
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most full-service cities, the cost of providing fire protection will take up almost the entirety
of the property tax revenues of that city.57

On the revenue side of the budget these

differences in financial responsibility among cities are generally reflected in the allocation of
property tax revenue. Therefore, in a partial service city, that does not dispense all of these
services, any property tax revenue that the city receives is essentially money ahead compared
to its neighbor.
In addition to this variation in program responsibilities, county governments also vary
in the extent to which their residents live in cities. In some counties, such as Los Angeles and
Alameda, the vast majorities of residents live in cities and receive municipal services from
their city governments.
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Other counties, have fewer, or no, cities – or function as both a

city and a county, such as San Francisco, therefore having fewer responsibilities.
Unincorporated areas are prevalent in California. In 2000, almost one in every five
California’s lived in an unincorporated area.59 These areas are regions of land that are not
part of any municipality. Lacking the state and federal funds that support mandated
countywide programs, the services delivered to unincorporated areas depend primarily on
property tax and sales tax raised in that particular area. Thus, local governments with wider
responsibilities, and more incorporated cities, typically receive more property taxes than
governments with fewer responsibilities.

The discrepancies that occur across counties

happen for a range of reasons. It is not only because of the allocation formula that was
enacted because of Proposition 13 that local governments receive different portions of
revenue.
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Has Proposition 13 Worked?

It is important to realize that Proposition 13 has accomplished its primary goal despite
some of the issues that are brought up in opposition to the measure. Property taxes have been
kept low and individuals have been able to stay in their homes. Despite Proposition 13’s
initial tax cut and large decrease in revenues, property tax revenue has become one of the
most reliable of any tax revenue source in the state. Even with the two percent assessment
cap property tax revenues have held steady at a rate higher than inflation. Assuming that
government is functioning responsibility, revenues have kept up with the cost of providing
services.
Proposition 13 has provided California with a steady increase in property tax revenue
while serving to protect the individual taxpayer. Rampant inflation was driving people out of
their homes, and if were not for the two percent cap set on assessment values per year, many
people would not be able to own homes today. Taxpayers in California have been able to
enjoy something they rarely, if ever before, had under property tax reassessments: certainty.
As economist Adam Smith stated: “The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in
taxation, a matter of so great importance that a very considerable degree of inequality, it
appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very
small degree of uncertainty.”60 Prior to Proposition 13, counties were able to decide what
rate they wanted to set for revenues each year. They were able to move the rates up and down
and thus were never struggling to reach the amount of revenues needed to match
expenditures. It is imperative that people are able to understand the amount and be able to
predict the amount they will be paying in taxes from year to year. Now with Proposition 13,
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counties are not able to control rates. Taxation has become more equal across the board and
the struggle has come because now governments have to learn to live within their means.
They only receive a certain amount of revenues each year and they must make tough
decisions on what to spend their money on, since they do not have unlimited amounts. The
current acquisition value property tax system is no more equitable than the traditional method
of property taxation where owners of more valuable property pay a higher tax fee for the
same services. This argument of equality ignores the nature of taxes. If we were that
concerned that there is a direct correlation between the amount of tax paid and level of
services we would create a system that only used user fees. Un-equity is not a sufficient
argument to use against the constitutionality of the acquisition system set out by Proposition
13. Proposition 13 removed the fear that future taxes would be controlled by an inflated
value, would be based on activity in the real estate market, as well as other economic factors
over which the taxpayer had no control over.
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Chapter 3: Why Proposition 13 is Misunderstood

Counties have multiple roles in California. Since they are the administrative arm of
the state, they are responsible for public assistance, public protection, and health services in
their geographical boundaries. Counties, however, are also responsible for delivering local
assistance and providing local services to unincorporated areas. The results from property
taxes being tied to county revenue sources has led to some unintended consequences for local
governments. In addition, critics of Proposition 13 have linked a number of misunderstood
factors to the measure. Redevelopment, new city incorporations and annexations,
fiscalization of land use, and the two-thirds majority vote requirement in local elections for
local governments that wish to raise special taxes are often said to have been caused
specifically by Proposition 13.

Redevelopment used as a Revenue Generator

Redevelopment has been used as a creative mechanism to recapture “lost” funds. In
1980, California had 197 redevelopment agencies with 300 project areas by the end of 1996
these numbers had grown to 399 agencies and 744 project areas.
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It is often argued that

through Proposition 13, Californian’s deprived cities the ability to raise revenues through
property tax increases, but still expected cities to provide the same level of services.62
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Proposition 13 set limits and restrictions on local government revenues. This change required
governments to find ways to allocate funds more efficiently. Before Proposition 13, local
governments did not have economize because they could set rates wherever they wanted
from year to year. The redevelopment process is often attributed to becoming popular due to
cities and counties need for revenue after the allocation process for Proposition 13 was
formed. However, even with the cap set by Proposition 13, it is not true that overall
revenues in counties decreased after Proposition 13, they increased, but by a contained
amount.63
Beginning in the late 1940s, California became the first state to use the technique of
tax increment financing as a development tool. This strategy is a method to use future gains
in taxes to finance current improvements, which theoretically will create the conditions for
those future gains. Redevelopment is a very powerful financial tool that is often used by
local governments to influence the direction and economic situation of a community. Under
the redevelopment process a local jurisdiction forms a redevelopment agency, which is
authorized by the statue under the general provisions of the state constitution. This agency
can then declare a section of the jurisdiction to be “blighted.” Any increase in the property
tax receipts that occur after this designation is shared only by the redevelopment agency as
well as any overlapping jurisdictions. The goal is to ensure that redevelopment occurs and
thus a tax increment will be generated. In order for this to happen, the redevelopment agency
issues debt, with the proceeds of the debt issuance going to improve the blighted area. As the
area improves, developers move in and cause an increase in property values, which in turn
generates the property tax increment. This tax increment funds the original debt that was
issued by the redevelopment agency.
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There are at least three reasons why redevelopment agencies are being used in an
increasing way to combat fiscal stress.64 First, prior to 1993, the criteria to establish a
blighted area were not very well defined. Any property could be deemed blighted and would
therefore provide justification for creating a redevelopment area. Even empty, undeveloped
land could be designated blighted, which was particularly attractive because undeveloped
land does not generate much, if any, property and sales tax revenue so any type of building
on that land would yield significant tax dollar increases. Second, voter approval is not needed
to use redevelopment debt to finance infrastructure. This creates a new revenue source by
avoiding a lengthier approval process. Finally, redevelopment can be used as an incentive
tool to encourage businesses to relocate to that particular area with the promised benefits of
infrastructure improvements that are provided by the redevelopment agency.
The expansion of redevelopment has represented an enlargement of the government
into our traditional system of private property and free enterprise. Because the criteria for
designating a city as blighted are extremely vague, many areas that are not in despair have
been classified as redevelopment areas. This means that increases in property tax revenues
are diverted to the redevelopment agency and away from cities, counties, and school districts
that would normally receive the funds. Additionally, cities cannot use redevelopment money
to pay for operations, public safety, or maintenance, which are by far the largest share of
municipal budgets. Legislation has been passed to tighten definitions of blight however, the
enforcement of the law is relaxed.
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If redevelopment were a temporary measure, the

diversion of funds may be sustainable. Once the agency disbanded, all of the property tax
revenues would be restored to local governments, however, while legally agencies are
supposed to sunset after forty years, the law to do this is easily circumvented. Of the 359
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redevelopment agencies that have been created by cities across California, only four have
ever been disbanded.
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While the passage of Proposition 13 did have an effect on the rapid

increase in redevelopment districts, it does not make a valid argument to attribute to the
proliferation of redevelopment districts to the initiative. Legislation has been passed by the
state in order to reign in redevelopment districts, and in order to mitigate this issue these laws
need to be enforced. The definition of blight needs to be better clarified and restricted only
to districts that are actually in decay and need to be repaired. Additionally, the 40-year sunset
law must be enforced. If redevelopment agencies have truly been using their resources and
have efficiently eliminated blight, there should be no further need for them. If, in 40 years, a
district has not eliminated the degeneration, then there should be some set structure to
analyze what additional steps need to be taken to help move the process forward. If these two
steps were taken it would go a long way in helping to mitigate the negative effects of
redevelopment. Redevelopment agencies, similar to the property tax situations preProposition 13, allow governments to do things with the input of voters including
accumulating huge amounts of debt. There is a positive aspect behind redevelopment but it
needs to be regulated in order to fulfill its ambition of being a powerful financial tool to help
influence the direction and economic situation of a community in a productive way.

City Incorporations and Annexations

Other types of districts have sprung up in the last thirty years in addition to
redevelopment agencies. The most obvious is the wave of city incorporations and
annexations. When a new city incorporates or an existing city annexes land, property tax
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revenues are shifted from the county to the new or expanded city. Essentially when areas
have seceded from the counties in which they are located and incorporate as their own city,
they take away a piece of the property tax revenue allocated to counties.
In 1990, the legislature enacted SB 1559, which required city incorporations to be
revenue neutral.
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Under these provisions, a county Local Agency Formation Commission

(LAFCO) cannot approve a proposal for incorporation unless it finds that the amount of
revenues a new city would take from the county and affected agencies after incorporation
would be substantially equal to the amount of savings the county or agency would attain
from no longer providing the services that would be transferred to the city. This measure has
provided counties with the assurance that they can continue to receive the necessary funds in
order to remain able to provide countywide services to the new jurisdiction as well as the
residents of the county.
While revenue neutrality went a long way to assist counties in coping with new city
incorporations and annexations, the majority of new cities in California were incorporated
prior to 1992, with the peak coming prior to Proposition 13 in the period from 1946-67.68
People who dislike Proposition 13 argue that the county in which the incorporation takes
place is then deprived of the property tax and the sales tax that the new city makes. However,
critics do not always mention that the city is now responsible for providing services and the
county no longer has to take on that burden. The funds should be almost directly transferrable
if the county is keeping tabs on their budgets. Any sales tax generated by the area, before
incorporation, should have been used by the county to provide services in that particular area.
The only difference after incorporation is that the city is responsible for funding services
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based on its own tax stream. If it decides to contract with the county in order to receive
services, then it is directly paying the county for the work. Critics also argue that after
Proposition 13 local agencies could no longer adjust the property tax rate to compensate for
lost revenue when a new city incorporated. This argument solidifies the grounds for why
Proposition 13 passed: to protect the taxpayers. Local governments were able to move the
property tax rate to wherever they needed it to be without regard for the individual’s they are
affecting. Proposition 13 has increased the level of awareness and responsibility that local
governments must have as they no longer have unlimited resources.

Fiscalization of Land Use

While many supporters of Proposition 13 hold the idea that fiscalization of land use is
a bureaucratic term coined after Proposition 13 to point out more flaws in the initiative; it is a
valid type of taxing policy that has emerged in California and must be discussed. Often times
the fiscalization of land use is given a negative connotation and discussed in a way that
suggests it only appeared because of Proposition 13. However, regardless if we had
Proposition 13, the way land planning has been organized in local jurisdictions would not be
much different today.
Land planning in California is heavily influenced by the way that local governments
finance their operations. In California, a portion of the state-collected sales tax is returned to
the general fund of the local government where the sale took place – the situs jurisdiction.69
This rule means that localities with larger retail sectors will receive greater portions of sales
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tax. Because Proposition 13 reduced the revenues that would be received from property
taxes, local governments often make land use decisions based at least in part on fiscal
outcomes associated with new development. In California, sales tax now exceeds property
tax as the largest single source of tax revenue for municipalities. Due to this fact, land uses
that will generate sales tax revenues, in addition to property taxes, have become important for
local governments.
Local governments receive sales tax based on two formulas. The principle method,
originated in the Bradley-Burns Sales and Use Tax Act of 1955, generates sales tax revenues
as a function of the dollar value of sales that occurs in a specific location.
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Under this act,

for every dollar of sales the local government in whose jurisdiction the transaction occurred
receives one cent into the general fund. Local governments that feel fiscal stress and have the
desire to generate more revenue, and to maximize revenue, pay close attention to commercial
activities. The three most popular ways to generate a large amount of sales tax for an area are
“Big Box” retail stores like Walmart, Costco, shopping malls, and car dealerships. Many
jurisdictions try to encourage these types of structures over housing developments, in order to
benefit from the sales tax increases.
While some Proposition 13 critics have charged that this desire to chase sales tax
producing places has skewered land decision uses in cities; fiscal zoning and competition
between local governments precedes Proposition 13. It has never been empirically
demonstrated that there is a fiscalization of land use.71 While it would be hard to prove, or
disprove, it is important to remember simple market economics of supply and demand.
Business will not enter an area if there is not a demand for them and/or if it does not make
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financial sense. Regardless of the sales tax kick-back to the local government or the
municipalities preference for business’ that will generate sales tax, if a company is not going
to survive in a particular area they will not enter the market. Retail sales are essentially fixed
in quantity at any given level of population and wealth. Residents of a region can support
only so much retailing because individuals tend to budget only a limited portion of their
income for retail goods. If Proposition 13 were to disappear, it is safe to assume that a
majority, of the businesses in an area would still be in that market. The overall amount of
retailing is unlikely to change markedly because of sales tax competition among local
jurisdictions. Additionally, economic development battles occur all over the country where
local governments, communities, and states battle to receive a larger portion of the tax cut. It
does not logically follow to conclude that the reason local governments influence what types
of businesses are in their jurisdictions is solely the fault of Proposition 13 and the impact the
measure has had on limiting property taxes.

The Two-Thirds Vote

Proposition 13 changed the law to require a two-thirds vote for the Legislature to
raise state taxes and a two-thirds vote of the people to raise local taxes for special purposes.
However, contrary to what some people may think, Proposition 13 is not responsible for the
two-thirds vote requirement to pass the state budget or to pass local general obligation bonds.
Both of these requirements pre-date Proposition 13. These two issues, the budget and bonds,
make a point that the supermajority vote is often required in particular instances when the
people believe that this hurdle is necessary to being a sense of overall agreement to important
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issues. One flaw with the two-thirds vote is that it is only in place when taxes are going to be
raised. It only seems to follow to also request a two-thirds vote of the people to lower taxes.
When making a decision that will affect each and every Californian it makes sense that there
should be a super-majority consensus. If that cannot be reached, either by the legislature, or
by the people, then that decision is not what the people want, and therefore should not be
enacted. The government is supposed to provide goods and services for the people, and with
that comes a direct correlation to tax dollars paid in order to provide a revenue stream to fund
costs. If the people do not want to increase taxes, then they are also voting to limit services.
The struggle between big and small government is a constant tug of war in California, and it
should only be by votes of the super-majority of the people or legislature that these decisions
are enacted.

The Scapegoat

The largest misunderstood consequence of Proposition 13 is that on the ballot it
seemed as though it were simply a measure that would keep property taxes low and
predictable. While it did accomplish this, it has also turned out to be one of the largest
scapegoats for things that have gone wrong in California. However, it is not a justifiable
scapegoat. While it has had an influence on how California communities are shaped and
planned, there are a wide number of other reasons that these things have happened, and
would have happened in the absence of Proposition 13. The fight for funding has always
been an issue with government. The struggle to create a prosperous city with a steady stream
of taxes in order to fund services has always been a concern, and will continue to be one.
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While Proposition 13 did have an effect on the amount of property taxes generated, it is
important to remember that Proposition 13 did not eliminate the property tax, it reduced it.
Property taxes still generate a large amount of tax dollars. The issue now is that local
governments have to figure out the best way to spend their dollars. They do not have the
freedom to set property tax rates wherever they want to, Proposition 13 set up fences and
roadblocks that governments have to deal with.
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Chapter 4: Revenues and Inadequate Alternatives to Proposition 13
Ever since its passage, Proposition 13 has been cast as the curse of cash-strapped
local governments as it limited property tax revenues even as the California housing market
soared. An analysis of the revenue stream in the state of California and in local governments
shows that Proposition 13 is an unjustifiable scapegoat. It is an easy target that is often
pointed to for the reason why California is in, and has been in, such a significant fiscal crisis.
By analyzing the statistics from state revenue streams as well as local revenue streams, one
can see that not only have overall revenues increased over the last 30 years for the state of
California but, property tax revenues have increased proportional to inflation for local
governments. Despite shocks to the economy like the dot.com boom and bust, and the
housing bubble, overall revenue levels have adjusted and steadily expanded. Additionally,
the acquisition-value system has worked to provide a solid level of predictability for both
individual property owners and budget directors. While many alternatives have been
proposed to reshape Proposition 13, the bottom line is that Proposition 13 has accomplished
its goal.

Revenue Streams for all Levels of Government

Table 2: California Public Revenues for all Levels of Government and Percentage Share
Level Receiving
Revenue

1978

1981

1988

1992

1995
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State

23,202,407,119
39.9%

32,386,866,000
41.8%

52,915,676,000
39.8%

79,213,651,000
42.3%

85,662,226,000
41.8%

Counties

9182173418
15.8%

11,002,462,589
14.2%

19,629,130,409
14.7%

29,873,677,459
15.9%

31,858,760,981
15.6%

Cities

8,472,134,749
14.6%

11,329,778,228
6.8%

20,248,790,547
15.2%

27,325,541,671
14.5%

30,796,774,219
15.1%

Independent
Special Districts
and
School
Districts

3,665,344,143
6.3%
8,978,391,928

5,282,467,621
14.2%
10,963,606,830
14.2%

10,274,183,865
7.7%
18,805,199,859
14.1%

11,724,148,380
6.2%
24,915,087,181
13.3%

12,726,996,423
6.2%
27,674,571,941
13.5%

Public
Postsecondary
Education

4,630,040,287
8.0%

6,509,053,000
8.4%

11,376,175,000
8.5%

14,696,063,000
7.8%

15,905,264,000
7.8%

Total

58,130,491,644
100%

77,474,234,378
100%

133,249,155,680
100%

187,848,168,691
100%

204,584,593,564
100%
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Table 2 highlights two facts. First, all levels of government in California between
1978 and 1995 have experienced significant growth in reported revenues. Revenues at nearly
every level of public service averaged an annual growth rate of just below eight percent.
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Second, there has been an extremely constant and stable rate of growth, especially given the
economic shocks and disruptions that have occurred over this period of time; demonstrating
one of the main benefits brought about by Proposition 13’s two percent cap on
reassessments. This would indicate that at the macro level, the revenues of all state and local
governments were equally affected by these shocks, although, the shocks did not change the
nature of the revenues or the distribution of power between state and local governments.

Revenue Stream for the State
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Property tax revenues did take a large cut immediately following the passage of
Proposition 13. State and local property tax revenues fell from $11 billion in fiscal year 1978
to $6 billion in fiscal year 1979.74 However, since the initial revenue shock, overall General
Fund revenues in California have consistently increased since the passage of Proposition 13.
Opponents of the initiative have voiced concerns that the property tax reductions created by
Proposition 13 have required excessive program cuts and led to the poor state of our
education system, infrastructure, and general shape of California today. In spite of the limits
and rollbacks that Proposition 13 imposed, state and local revenues did not fall
proportionately. When revenues are adjusted for inflation and population growth, they have
grown 20 percent from fiscal year 1977-78 to fiscal year 2009-10. The overall tax base
expanded by more than enough to offset the initial decline in revenue that occurred.
Chart 1: Total State General Fund Revenues in Real Dollars

As shown by the above chart, chart 1, state government real General Fund revenues,
which are adjusted for inflation and population growth increased between fiscal year 1977-78
and fiscal year 2009-10. Additionally, relative to other states, California has been able to
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keep property taxes at a lower, but steadily increasing rate, which has increased predictability
as well as dependability on this source of tax revenue. 75 Property tax revenues directly affect
the General Fund because they are used to support K–12 and community college districts as
part of the Proposition 98 formula.

76

Proposition 98 sets a minimum funding guarantee for

K–14 education based on growth in the economy and overall General Fund revenues. Once
the guarantee is determined, local property taxes going to schools offset a portion of the
state’s obligation under Proposition 98. The General Fund pays for the remaining amount. As
a result, increases or decreases in property tax revenues affect the General Fund cost under
Proposition 98. In 2007–08, local property taxes contributed $14.5 billion to schools and
community colleges.77 Thus, property taxes represented a larger “revenue source” for the
state than corporate taxes. The changes in control, composition, and spending discretion of
public finance over the last thirty years have generally favored the state government
compared to local governments.

Revenue Stream for Local Governments

The below chart, chart 2, shows total revenues for local governments in California in
constant 2003 dollars for fiscal year 1977-78 to fiscal year 2006-07. Similar to overall state
revenues, local gove rnment revenues have steadily increased since 1978. County
government real revenues in California have increased by about 8.43 percent from fiscal year
1977-78 to fiscal year 2002-03. 78
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Chart 2: Total Local Government Revenues, Real Dollars

As local government’s ability to raise revenue, particularly property taxes, was
constrained and as the state took more control of education, the power of the state
government began to increase relative to local governments. Due to this, local governments
have become increasingly reliant on revenue streams that are not under their control, namely
revenue transfers from the state. Additionally, state transfers to counties have increased
tremendously and now constitute, by far, the largest source of county revenues.
As shown by the below chart, chart 3, federal transfers to county governments have
also grown during this period, from a little over $6.2 billion in fiscal year 1977-78 to almost
$8.6 billion in fiscal year 2002-03. Property tax revenues, largely due to Proposition 13, have
declined significantly. They have fallen from almost $7.8 billion in fiscal year 1977-78 to
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approximately $4.9 billion in fiscal year 2002-03. 79 This decline in property tax revenues has
been countered by a sharp increase in charges for current services by local governments.
There is a prevalent issue of local self-control and the ability of local governments to respond
to local preferences. The declining ability to generate revenue streams for local purposes has
become increasingly problematic as local governments seek to provide services to the
growing and changing populations that are emerging as a result of demographic shifts
sweeping the state. As unfunded mandates and other requirements are directed to local
governments by the state, local governments ability to respond to local needs and preferences
are furthered hampered.
Chart 3: Total County Revenue by Category, Real Dollars

80

Local governments have responded to fiscal limits by maximizing revenue sources
over which they retain control in order to replaces losses in property taxes. In spite of
Proposition 13, California per capita local government revenue has increased over time and
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remains higher than the average in other states. The main issue that has changed has been the
make-up of the composition of local revenue, not the total dollar amount.
California counties have a dual fiscal structure reflecting their multipurpose role,
heavily reliant on two revenue sources – property taxes and state money. With Proposition
13, counties had to respect the cap placed on assessment values and were not able to set rates
to wherever they needed to bring in the amount of revenue they needed to meet expenditures.
Compared to pre-Proposition 13, counties now have limited countywide taxing power, with
their power to raise general-purpose revenue from sales taxes, utility use taxes, and transient
occupancy taxes in unincorporated areas. California counties have the ability to raise sales
taxes by one-half cent for transportation purposes, subject to voter approval. These funds
make up about one-third of local transportation revenue in California.
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Because of their

heavy dependence on property taxes, it is often argued that California counties were hit hard
by Proposition 13. However, in looking at the above charts that compare property tax
revenues received at the local government level in 1978 and 2009, when compared to
inflation, the rates remain relatively unchanged.

Advantages of Acquisition-Value Assessments

Acquisition-value assessments provide substantially greater predictability and
certainty of revenue flows, with property tax revenues growing at a steadier clip than any
other revenue source in the state. Since the adoption of Proposition 13, property tax revenues
have grown on average about ten percent compounded annually from 1980-81 to 1991-92.
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Table 3: Property Tax Levies: Dollars in Thousands
Fiscal
Year
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
2004-05
Average
Annual
Growth
(excluding
‘04-05)

Property Tax Levies

Percent
Growth

$6,360,276
$7,185,005
$8,007,037
$8,634,771
$9,437,482
$10,274,050
$11,125,581
$12,203,844
$13,307,539
$14,720,218
$16,398,256
$17,687,106

13.0 %
11.4%
7.8%
9.3%
8.9%
8.3%
9.7%
9.0%
10.6%
11.4%
7.9%

$34,520,776

51.0%

9.80%
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This shows that one of the main goals of Proposition 13 has worked; keeping property
taxes stable and predictable. High volatility in tax systems lead to a lack of certainty of
revenue for governmental agencies for planning, budgeting and management purposes. A
Cal-Tax study based on reports published by the Board of Equalization shows that property
tax revenue under the pre-Proposition 13 market-value tax system was 2.9 times more
volatile than the acquisition-value tax system under Proposition 13.83 Recently, in the last
five years, California has been in an economic cycle that had reduced the value of residential
property, and the impact has been dramatic in many regions of California. Yet, despite these
reductions in some assessments of more than thirty percent for recently acquired properties,
the acquisition-value based system continues to produce modest increase in overall property
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tax revenue to these jurisdictions.84 In 1992, a recession year, property tax revenue growth
was 7.7 percent, as shown by the above chart. The acquisition value assessment system acts
in a counter-cyclical manner, working against the tendencies in the economy to cool down
the economy when it is in an upswing and stimulate the economy when it is in a downturn.
This works to provide stability in the flow of steady property tax revenue to local
governments. While some argue that the recession has had a negative impact on property
taxes because of the way the system is currently set up, they are incorrect in these judgments.
The unrealized market value that is taxed when properties change hands ensures that there
will be steady revenue flows. Acquisition value assessments create reserve of value that
accrues to local entities each year when homes are sold, remodeled, or increased by the two
percent inflation factor and brought up to current market value. Even with falling real estate
values property taxes have grown steadily because of this built in reserve value.
Furthermore, homeowners who hold on to their property for a period of time do not pay less
property tax in a down market, even if the current market value of their home drops. The
only option property owners are given to have their property reassessed at a lower value, is to
file an appeal to the County Assessor asking for a reduction. If California did not have
Proposition 13 and was still using a market-value property tax system, during times of an
economic recession, property taxes would have drastic reductions, resulting in diminishing
revenues to the state and to local jurisdictions.

Pressure to Change
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Currently, the most popular argument to change Proposition 13 is to develop a split
roll tax system to take the place of the acquisition system. A split roll tax would divide the
tax treatment of commercial and residential properties by removing Proposition 13
protections from commercial properties, while leaving the protections intact for residential
properties. Currently the reassessment cap of two percent is extended to both residential and
commercial properties, a split roll tax would change this requirement for commercial
properties.
The strongest argument against a split roll tax is that it would undermine the intent of
many of the protections that were put into place with Proposition 13. Prior to Proposition 13,
assessors used the theory of “highest and best” which meant that the property value was
determined by considering the highest and best use of property, rather than the actual use.
Because of this, assessments were unpredictable and subjective. A return to market value
assessments for commercial property would return to this undesirable assessment theory by
shifting taxes from an objective standard to a subjective one, leading to arbitrary assessments
and more appeals.
Commercial properties contribute significantly in tax dollars – and implementing the
split roll would mean tax increases for California businesses likely to exceed $3 billion a
year.85 Increasing taxes for commercial properties would not occur in a vacuum – it will not
only harm business, especially small business, but it will reduce their ability to provide jobs,
benefits and cost savings to both employees and customers. Such a move would create a lesscompetitive climate for California’s businesses to expand and create jobs and would hurt the
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state’s already fragile economy. It has been predicted that bringing all business property to
full-market value could result in the loss of 100,000 to 150,000 jobs.86
Even the most limited split-roll tax would increase taxes by billions of dollars
annually. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimated that if a split-roll measure was passed in
2005 that would have changed assessment of business property to reflect fair market value, it
would have resulted in a $3.5 billion gross increase in property tax revenues.87 The split-roll
would adversely impact small businesses because their rental costs would increase with
higher property taxes. Commercial buildings, shopping centers and business parks are all
held in corporate ownership and most commercial leases allow for increases in rent to reflect
increased property taxes. Smaller business however, would be less able to absorb a sudden
rent increase due to reassessment, and would likely have to close down if the split-roll tax
were enacted. 88
The Real Issue

In 1911, an amendment to the California Constitution established the California
initiative process, giving voters the right to enact legislation. This was a huge step in giving
voters a power equal to the power of the legislative branch of state government. Of the 1234
initiatives that have been circulated from 1912-2000, 303 of them, 24 percent, have been on
matters of taxation and government regulation.89 Proposition 13 is one of the best known
initiatives and one of the first in a long series of voter-approved initiatives that have
constrained state and local governments’ ability to tax citizens. Some of the most significant
of these initiatives include Proposition 4 in 1979, which limited the growth of state and local
spending; Proposition 98 in 1988, which set minimum spending levels for K-14 education;
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Proposition 218 in 1996, which restricted local government revenue raising ability by
reducing the amount of fees, assessments and taxes that individuals and businesses pay; and
Proposition 26 in 2010 which required a two-thirds vote to pass fees, levies, charges and tax
revenue allocations that under previous rules could be enacted by a simple majority vote.
While Proposition 13 did have a large effect on revenue streams for local governments, the
initiative by itself has not caused the downfall of California. One area that has had a large
impact on the current situation in California involves bond debt. Bond financing is a type of
long-term borrowing that the state uses to raise money for various purposes. The state has
traditionally used bonds to finance major capital outlay projects such as roads, educational
facilities, prisons, parks, and water projects. The state’s cost for using bonds depends
primarily on the amount sold, their interest rates, the time period over which they are repaid,
and their maturity structure. The issue that comes with bonds is while having a bond on the
ballot looks nice, and the projects they are supporting are often positive, many individuals do
not understand that bonds must be repaid. Therefore, they often approve them without
understanding all of the consequences that come with them.
The initiative process was designed as part of the progressive movement, molded out
of people’s frustration at the government. It was created in order to give voters a say in how
they would like government services to work. The plethora of voter initiatives dealing with
local finance have worked together to hamper governments ability to raise revenues to pay
for desired local services and their discretion over how to spend the monies that they do
obtain. Over the last three decades, the initiative has had three significant effects on fiscal
policy. First, it has cut the overall size of state and local government, second, the initiative
process shifted disbursement of funds from state to local governments and decentralized
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government spending and third it altered the way funds are raised: it reduced the reliance on
taxes in favor of user fees and charges for services. 90
The California initiative process is a fundamentally different form of policymaking
then the process the legislature and executive branch perform. Among the other twenty-three
state that have an initiative process, some have a blend of the functions of the
legislative/executive branch and the initiative process.
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Once an initiative receives enough

signatures and qualifies for the ballot, it only requires a majority of the voters to vote on it in
order to become a law, even when the initiative requires a constitutional amendment. This
difference in the two-thirds vote needed by the legislature, compared to half the voters plus
one needed to pass an initiative, can make the initiative process a very attractive option for
interest groups, as well as the general public.
The inherent flaw with the initiative process is that citizens vote to mandate a
spending obligation without understanding the long-term budget impacts of the proposals.
Voters tend to be far more supportive of tax cuts or of increased spending on popular
programs, when these questions are proposed in isolation, as often done in an initiative.
Without a massive media campaign to explain the stakes and effects the measure will have, it
is too easy for voters to approve both the tax cuts and the spending hikes, regardless of the
consequences on the state budget. Initiatives also lack the given and taken of the legislative
process. Once something is placed on the ballot it cannot be tweaked or debated like
legislation through the House and Senate is. It would be beneficial to have an indirect
initiative. This reform would allow a path for initiatives to qualify for the ballot with a lower
signature threshold on the condition that they would be first submitted to the legislature for
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review. A sunset review for initiatives that contain fiscal impacts should also be enacted to
place a limiting provision on all initiatives that have a fiscal impact, either positive or
negative, on the state. This expiration date would allow the legislature to review the
effectiveness of the initiative, including its monetary consequences, and then they could
decide whether or not the program should be extended. An additional reform, that would
permit some check to be made on the voter’s decisions, would be to allow the legislature to
amend initiatives, as is the rule in other initiative states. California is the only initiative state
where the legislatures may not repeal or amend a statutory initiative. It would be beneficial to
establish a nonpartisan, appointed panel to review initiative proposals before they go on the
ballot and allow this group to make non-binding suggestions for improvement. Currently, in
California successful initiatives can only be changed by a subsequent vote of the people
regardless of the success or failure of the program or policy that the initiative implements.
This reform would maintain the goal of allowing citizens to demand policy changes via the
initiative, yet allows enough flexibility to offer suggestions to improve the measure and
allows the initiative to change course if the desired outcomes of the policy changes are not
achieved. The initiative process is an important aspect of California’s government. While it
would not be politically feasible to prohibit all initiatives that affect the budget, a strong
argument can be made for creating a rule that would require future ballot initiatives that
would affect the budget to be revenue neutral. Any initiative that had the effect of lowering
taxes would have to specify which spending programs would be cut in order to offset the loss
in revenues. Any ballot initiative that increased spending would need to specify which taxes
would be raised in order to pay for this spending. Although requiring revenue neutral ballot
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initiatives would solve all of the problematic dynamics, this proposal would counteract the
main negative consequences of passing complicated tax legislation by an initiative process.
Proposition 13 by itself has not had the power to change the scope of California.
However, when combined with other initiatives and other fiscal constraints that are passed by
the initiative process, a larger ungovernable beast is formed. Some of the issues that have
come about because of these laws could be mitigated if the above suggestions were put into
place.
Proposition 13 has accomplished its ultimate goal of protecting voters and creating a
predictable property tax structure. However, the fact is that it has done so while creating a
large amount of controversy. The above data analysis demonstrates that revenues at both the
state and local levels have not been negatively affected by the passage of Proposition 13.
However, the assessment cap placed at two percent remains, and will remain, a major point
of contention. Regardless, the above charts as well as the following case study show that
revenues have increased at a rate faster than inflation over the last thirty years.
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Chapter 5: Case Study of Orange County

The following chapter analyzes the revenues and expenditures of Orange County,
California to support the argument that Proposition 13 is not the cause of fiscal crisis in
California’s local governments. Despite arguments that the two percent cap on reassessments
has kept property tax revenues lower than inflation, when the numbers are crunched, this
argument proves to be false.
Orange County, the Southern California County located in between Los Angeles and
San Diego is best known as the home of Disneyland and the rich and famous who live in its
million dollar coast homes. There is a myth that Orange County works within a bubble that
has no bearing on the rest of California. While it is often described as a wealthy white
suburb, Orange County’s population is in line with the rest of the state. The vast majority of
Orange County’s 3 million residents are not wealthy; they are people who are living in the
middle class. The county can no longer be described as racially homogeneous and white.
After a large foreign immigration in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Hispanics and Asians make up
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about a third of the County’s population.92 A large number of residents live in poverty and
depend on the health care and social services that are provided by the County government.
As the sixth more populous county in the United States, Orange County provides a
strong basis for my case study. While it may not be the typical California County, the wide
range and number of people that reside in the County and the broad list of services the
County is expected to administer, gives a strong background for analyzing property tax
revenue levels compared to inflation as well as expenditures.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the allocation structure for Proposition 13 was set by SB
154 and AB 8 in 1979. The state formula indicated what percentage of funds would be
allocated to counties, cities, special districts and schools. These levels were chosen at this
point, and have not been changed since 1979. While it may make sense to re-calculate the
formula up to the current state of counties, if Orange County were to increase its percentage,
then other counties would have to decrease theirs in order to keep the total allocation equal.
While Orange County would benefit from a percentage increase, it is not feasible to assume
other counties will give up some of the revenues they are receiving. At the time the formula
was created, Orange County was not as populous as it is today. In 1980, Orange County only
had 1.9 million residents.

93

Therefore, the County government was not offering as many

services and using as many resources as it is are today. As a result, while the state average of
property tax funds given to counties is 17 percent, Orange County receives 13 percent, which
equals about $511 million in general fund revenue per year. 94 Since that time, the population
of Orange County has increased dramatically, yet the percentage of monies allocated remains
the same. Orange County has been able take steps to offset the low levels of property tax
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revenue that it has received. The citizens of Orange County, passed Proposition 172, a local
ballot measure in 1993 that earmarked one-half cent of the existing sales tax for local public
safety services, including law enforcement, prosecutors, and fire protection.
Frank Kim, the County of Orange’s current budget director, argues that Proposition
13 has depressed growth in property tax revenues received by the County. He stated that in
Orange County, property values are going up almost every year but because of the
restrictions Proposition 13 imposed, the County Assessor is not able to increase property
taxes by that amount. This has restricted the amount of revenues received and has created an
internal struggle in the budget office. In creating the budget, the CEO Budget Office has to
be careful in how they manage expenses, because if expenditures grow faster than 2 percent,
the County will be in trouble.
In Orange County, as shown in the below chart, chart 4, property taxes make up 75
percent of the General Fund. 95
Chart 4: Orange County General Fund Revenue: 2009-10 Total = 700.8 Million
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However, the County also benefits from vehicle license fees and sales tax. Orange
County does have a leg up on other counties since tourism is such a large industry, and there
is a pocket of affluent individuals in the County. People tend to buy more consumer goods
and products in Orange County then compared to less affluent counties, like Orange
County’s neighbor, Riverside County. Additionally, in comparison to other counties, in
Orange County a larger percentage of people drive new cars, and own more cars then the
number of drivers per household.96 This allows the County revenue stream to benefit from
receiving more vehicle license fees, as well as sales tax than in other counties. Kim stressed
that, “we do well compared to other counties based on our revenue sources.” Despite the
ability that Orange County has to rely on vehicle license fees and sales tax, property taxes
still make up the majority of the General Fund. Therefore, analyzing the overall revenues in
Orange County, and comparing them to expenditures will provide a solid glance into the
question if Proposition 13 has created the budget crunch that many local governments are
battling today.
Kim held the idea that among budget directors across California, most counties are
unhappy with Proposition 13. Strictly from a budget prospective, he noted that counties lose
the ability to grow the revenues at the same time expenses are growing. However, when this
was occurring previous to Proposition 13, the rampant inflation and huge increases in
assessed housing values were running people out of their homes. Previously the county
controlled the rates; now it does not have the ability to do that. Before, Orange County, and
many other counties never had a revenue issue because they could make the rates whatever
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they wanted from year to year; now, with Proposition 13, they have a cap that they have to
work with.
The main argument against Proposition 13 is that with the two percent cap, revenues
have not been able to increase as fast as inflation. Kim argued that on an average year the
CPI in California is about three percent, and property taxes cannot grow at anything faster
than two percent, revenues suffer. As inflation increases, prices increase and the cost of
operating services increases. Due to Proposition 13, he contends that revenues have been set
at an artificial limit and not been able to keep up with inflation, so as a result services have
had to be cut. The below graph indicates that net revenues over the last 30 years have
generally stayed above revenues that have been adjusted for inflation. This means that
revenues in Orange County are increasing faster than the inflation rate.

Right after

Proposition 13 was passed revenues were at about the same level, then around 1990 they
began to increase at a faster rate, holding steady in 2000 and then increasing faster than
inflation over the last ten years. According to this chart and my analysis of the budget
numbers, even though Proposition 13 set the limit at two percent for reassessments, and
inflation tends to run at 2.5 percent-3 percent, this has not had any negative impact on the
way revenues have increased over the last 30 years.
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Chart 5: Orange County Inflation Adjusted Revenues vs. Net Revenues

In addition, the below chart graphs expenditures over the last thirty years in order to
see if costs have been increasing at a faster rate than inflation and at a faster rate than
revenues. If so, then the argument that Proposition 13 is the cause for the budget crunch
among local governments is invalid. Instead, it should be stated that excessive costs are the
cause of the difficulty. According to my data, and the below graph, net county costs have
increased faster than costs adjusted for inflation, as well as revenues adjusted for inflation.
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Chart 6: Orange County Net Revenues compared to Net Costs and State Inflation

According to these findings, rising, rampant, costs are the main reason why Orange
County is facing a budget crunch. While Proposition 13 did set a two percent limit on
reassessments, we see in the first graph that revenues have increased at a rate faster than
inflation. Webster Guillory, the Orange County Assessor, noted that “there is no question that
the government has less money to spend today. But, Proposition 13 is not the culprit.” In
Orange County, when the newly assessed houses are factored into the equation, property
valuations per year are around eight percent to eleven percent which, as shown in both charts,
is exceeding the CPI. 97 Across California property taxes have averaged an 8 percent increase
per year. Because change of ownership brings property values to full market value, plus new
construction, the total property tax increase is greater than average inflation. 98
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Throughout Orange County there are approximately 900,000 parcels of property that
are assessed each year.
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As of 2010, there are about 100,000 parcels that still have pre-

Proposition 13 base values.
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Each year this number slightly decreases as a percentage of

these houses are sold or remodeled and brought up to the current base year. Even with ten
percent of the parcels having a base value coming from prices more than thirty years ago,
County revenues have still increased quicker than inflation.
The main question that comes about because of these results is the political argument
of how much one is willing to pay for services. Many people who vote tend to be in the
middle to affluent class, and they are not the people who tend to rely on County services.101
There is an inverse relationship between people who fund local government and the people
who use local government. Proposition 13 is not the reason why the County budget is in such
a terrible state. Rising costs that are, as shown by the above graph, increasing at a rate faster
than inflation and faster than revenues, are the issue. The overall structure of the government
was set up to serve the people, and the goods and services that are offered are directly
affected by how much the people pay in taxes. In addition, local governments are often
required to provide services that are often not cost effective to provide, but they have to
administer them as no one else, particularly not the state, will do so. Expenditures need to fall
in line with revenues in order to have a strong budget. In order to do this, costs need to be
brought down. If the people vote to decrease taxes, and therefore decrease revenues, this is
speaking to the government to decrease services and their scope of influence, and the steps to
do this need to be taken. However, this is much easier said than done. Individuals tend to be
contradictory in that they want to pay less in taxes but prefer service levels to stay the same,
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or increase. This balance is impossible to achieve, yet it remains an important factor to
understand when discussing taxes.

Conclusion
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California has been seen not as a promise but as the embodiment of the American
future – the dream made into a reality. “No. 1 State: Booming, Beautiful California,” said
Newsweek’s cover line. “California: A State of Excitement,” said the headline in Time.102
California is a pioneering megastate that has become a world force with eclectic people,
commerce, tourism, and technology. California is a state possessed of a certain glamour, rich
with the possibilities of a greater life. However, California today is largely different from
California 50 years ago. California is no longer the progressive model in its public
institutions and services – the overall condition of the state has declined.
During the three decades since the passage of Proposition 13, California has been in a
constant revolt against large government. Proposition 13 is often talked about as the reason
why California has experienced such a decline. It is the scapegoat for everything that has
gone wrong in California. However, Proposition 13 remains sacrosanct, an icon of public
policy that no politician dare attack. Proposition 13 is credited with preserving the homes and
economic security of millions of people. Despite the negativity attached to it from politicians
and academics, Proposition 13 would still pass today by a 2-1 margin.103
It is valid to argue that had Proposition 13 not been passed, revenues would be much
higher today. However, as shown in Chapter 4, total state General Fund revenues and total
local government revenues have increased since 1978. Additionally, the reason why
Proposition 13 passed was to protect the individual homeowner, and the measure
successfully accomplished this goal. Proposition 13, by itself, has not created the budget
crisis in California. There are a diverse range of reasons why California is in trouble, and
Proposition 13 should not be looked to as the scapegoat for California’s problems.
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Proposition 13 is always going to be controversial, regardless of what evidence comes
out supporting or opposing the measure. There have been and there will continue to be moves
to reform the process. However, the evidence that Proposition 13 would still pass today is
significant. Symbolism is important in politics. The symbolism that the citizens of California
still have a strong desire to support Proposition 13, speaks volumes about the authority and
strength that the measure holds.
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